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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [PINS](#) [PNAT](#) [IZ](#)  
SUBJECT: MSNSA WAELI PUSHES TO ESTABLISH MINISTRY OF  
NATIONAL SECURITY

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons  
1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (C REL AUS UK) SUMMARY: Charge Speckhard met with Shirwan Waeli, Minister of State for National Security, to express our concerns over the draft Ministry of National Security Law (MNSL) currently stalled in the Council of Representatives. Waeli asserted that the law is critical to establishing a productive ministry and is consistent with Iraq's constitution. Waeli added that the proposed Iraqi National Security Law (INSL) is inadequate because it does not address the establishment of his ministry, but rather serves as an overall framework for intelligence operations. Waeli emphasized that his main priority is to create an effective, trust-worthy national security organization and insisted the Ministry of National Security would complement the Iraqi National Intelligence Service portfolio rather than compete with it. Charge Speckhard emphasized to Waeli that it would be better to establish an overall national security structure before creating a new ministry. END SUMMARY.

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MNSL Needed Now, INSL Will Fill in Gaps Later  
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12. (C REL AUS UK) In a March 16 meeting with Charge Speckhard, Minister of State for National Security Affairs Waeli discussed legislation that would transform the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs into the Ministry of National Security, with Waeli at its head. Waeli described how the rapid growth of his security organization requires increased financing and inclusion into Iraq's security architecture. This move will assist the government in establishing a secure and stable Iraq. Waeli suggested the INSL's role was to help coordinate intelligence and national security activities and enforce checks and balances.

13. (C REL AUS UK) The Charge suggested that it would be best to pass the INSL before addressing the MNSL. Waeli rejected this, asserting that there is no reason to delay passage of his legislation since it is constitutionally sound and has the approval of the Interior and Defense Ministers as well as Prime Minister Maliki. In addition, he claimed, the INSL fails to address the MNS's creation.

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Waeli Working to Build Trust  
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14. (C REL AUS UK) The CDA expressed concern that the draft MNSL mixes both intelligence and law enforcement functions and lacks sufficient measures to prevent abuses. Especially troubling, he noted, are the legislation's references to

"political crimes" and the need to "exterminate" them. Waeli assured him that the political crimes department would be geared to fight "terrorism, and not legitimate political parties." Waeli added he was well aware of people's mistrust of security organizations and his ministry has worked hard to change this. He acknowledged that, given Iraq's history, this was a difficult task, but he believed Iraqis are becoming more comfortable with the MNSA as they realize it can not be "bought and sold."

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MNS "Interrogation center" for "investigative" work  
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15. (C REL AUS UK) In response to the CDA's question on the laws stipulating "interrogation centers", Waeli stressed any interrogations conducted by the MSN will only be 'investigative' and any cases requiring further action will be brought the High Judicial Council. He assured the Charge there will be no detention centers in the MNS; suspects will be held at MOI detention centers. Waeli did not explain who would detain these suspects, how 'investigations' would be conducted, or how cases were brought before the High Judicial Council.

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INIS and the MNSA "not in competition"  
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16. (C REL AUS UK) Waeli noted that a recent CNN report asserted that he was in competition with the INIS. He claimed this is not true; the two entities would have different yet complementary responsibilities in the fight against terrorism. Waeli confirmed the MNSA would continue to send reports to the Council of Ministers, the Council of

Representatives and the various security ministries almost daily. He also claimed that he was making efforts to reach out to Iraq's Sunnis by establishing offices in Sunni-majority provinces staffed by Sunni officers and by recruiting Kurds and Sunnis in the MNSA offices in Baghdad.

17. (C REL AUS UK) CDA said General Petraeus and the Ambassador understood Waeli's intent in making his ministry more like the FBI, but this MNSL does not clearly do this. A clear national security structure for Iraq must precede the building of the individual organizations. CDA concluded the meeting promising to discuss the situation with General Petraeus and the Ambassador and meet again in a week with concrete suggestions.

KHALILZAD